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We reviewed mortality data of the 1918–19 inﬂ  uenza 
pandemic for 11 South Paciﬁ  c Island jurisdictions. Four of 
these appear to have successfully delayed or excluded 
the arrival of pandemic inﬂ  uenza by imposing strict mari-
time quarantine. They also experienced lower excess death 
rates than the other jurisdictions that did not apply quaran-
tine measures.
R
ecent pandemic plan development by many countries 
suggests the international concern about pandemic in-
ﬂ  uenza (1). However, no work has been published to date to 
inform such planning by evaluating islands’ border control 
practices to prevent the arrival of pandemic inﬂ  uenza. Yet 
border control is potentially easier to study for islands than 
for states with porous land borders, and for many island 
states with limited health and economic resources border 
control may provide the only practical defense against the 
introduction of pandemic inﬂ  uenza.
The Study
We aimed to identify the features that distinguished 
successful from unsuccessful border control attempts to 
exclude pandemic inﬂ  uenza from South Paciﬁ  c Island ju-
risdictions (including the “continental” island of Australia) 
during the 1918–19 inﬂ  uenza pandemic. Jurisdictions were 
deﬁ  ned as countries, territories, or states within federal sys-
tems that had the capacity to implement their own border 
control measures. Although island jurisdictions in the Pa-
ciﬁ  c are widely dispersed geographically, it appears that 
nearly all were at some risk for the spread of pandemic in-
ﬂ  uenza from ship-borne contact. The details of ship-borne 
spread of this pandemic in the Paciﬁ  c have been well docu-
mented (2,3). Indeed, we have only been able to identify 1 
area in the South Paciﬁ  c that had no reported arrival of the 
pandemic in the 1918–1922 period, i.e., the geographically 
remote Lau and Yasawa Islands (in the Fiji Group) (2).
Data on quarantine, pandemic arrival, and pandemic-at-
tributable health effects were accessed through a systematic 
search of Medline, Embase, Australasian Medical Index, 
and Web of Science. Archival data were accessed directly 
from the National Archives (in Wellington, New Zealand, 
and Canberra, Australia) and from government departments 
and websites for New Zealand; Australia; the Secretariat 
for the Paciﬁ  c Community Headquarters in Noumea, New 
Caledonia; and the World Health Organization.
Our literature search identiﬁ  ed 35 articles and docu-
ments that included information on the use of border control 
in 11 of 25 South Paciﬁ  c Island jurisdictions. An additional 
21 archival documents were reviewed. Four jurisdictions in 
this region met our deﬁ  nition of strict maritime quarantine 
(monitoring all passengers and crew for at least 1 day be-
fore disembarking was permitted). These jurisdictions were 
American Samoa (5 days’ quarantine) and Continental 
Australia, Tasmania, and New Caledonia (all 7 days’ quar-
antine). All of these jurisdictions delayed the arrival of the 
pandemic by implementing their own full maritime quaran-
tine (2–7) (Figure), although in the case of New Caledonia 
the quarantine was imposed by Australia. In each of these 
jurisdictions, local health ofﬁ  cials credited the success in 
delaying inﬂ  uenza to strict maritime quarantine.
While it was in force, the maritime quarantine used 
by American Samoa from November 23, 1918, appeared 
to exclude pandemic inﬂ  uenza  (2). Once inﬂ  uenza  did 
reach this jurisdiction in 1920, no recorded deaths were 
attributed to inﬂ  uenza (in a population of ≈8,000) (8). In 
contrast, inﬂ  uenza spread rapidly through Western Samoa 
(now named Samoa). The impact was ampliﬁ  ed by a lack 
of medical assistance and by food shortages in the area. 
Western Samoa had the worst death rate for any country or 
territory recorded in the 1918 pandemic, losing 19%–22% 
of its population (2).
Continental Australia implemented a maritime quaran-
tine in October 1918. The arrival of inﬂ  uenza was delayed 
until early January 1919 (14), 3 months after the pandemic 
had appeared in New Zealand, where no systematic form of 
border control was in effect. The Australian island state of 
Tasmania instituted a strict maritime quarantine beginning 
January 27, 1919, once the Australian state of New South 
Wales had reported cases of pandemic inﬂ  uenza (4). Pan-
demic inﬂ  uenza did not penetrate into Tasmania until Au-
gust 1919, and when it did, the chief health ofﬁ  cer noted that 
it was a milder infection than experienced on mainland Aus-
tralia. The resulting death rate for Tasmania of 0.81/1,000 
population (6) was one of the lowest recorded worldwide.
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New Caledonia was protected from the pandemic un-
til 1921 by the strict 7-day quarantine of outbound vessels 
from Australian ports that began in late 1918 (11,15). Vis-
iting ships from Sydney and Wallis Island were the even-
tual source of an inﬂ  uenza outbreak that began on July 17, 
1921 (11).
Partial quarantine (as deﬁ  ned by the routine release, 
without quarantine, of asymptomatic passengers) proved 
unsuccessful in both Fiji and Tahiti in French Polynesia in 
1918 (2,16). The other island jurisdictions that were iden-
tiﬁ  ed as using no measures of border control (see circles 
in Figure) experienced the arrival of pandemic inﬂ  uenza at 
similar times.
The Figure also shows the death rates attributed to 
pandemic inﬂ  uenza per 1,000 total population compared 
with the date of the ﬁ  rst recorded cases (for those jurisdic-
tions for which date of ﬁ  rst case and mortality data in the 
second wave of the 1918 pandemic were available). The 
jurisdictions of Australia, Tasmania, New Caledonia, and 
American Samoa appear to have beneﬁ  ted from a lower 
death rate resulting from delay in the arrival of inﬂ  uenza. 
Also, the lower death rates in some of these countries may 
have been partly attributable to such factors as preexisting 
levels of immunity, various socioeconomic characteristics 
of the populations (e.g., differing levels of poverty), and 
demographic factors (e.g., crowding and rurality). Unfor-
tunately, limitations of available historical data prevented 
exploring these issues.
Conclusions
Strict maritime quarantine appears to have been a suc-
cessful method for delaying and excluding inﬂ  uenza for at 
least 4 South Paciﬁ  c Island jurisdictions in the inﬂ  uenza 
pandemic that began in 1918. Some of these apparent ben-
eﬁ  ts of maritime quarantine may have been attributable to 
minimal ship contact and geographic remoteness, but these 
explanations are unlikely given that there were ultimately 
few places protected in this way in the Paciﬁ  c. The reasons 
for the lower mortality rates in jurisdictions that achieved 
successful delay are unclear. Viral attenuation over time 
is 1 possibility, although good supportive data for this and 
other explanations are lacking.
Nevertheless, the use of border control for the future 
protection of islands from pandemics must take into con-
sideration the different nature of 21st-century societies, 
such as contact as a result of regular air travel. Island juris-
dictions need to continue to undertake pandemic planning 
for effective border control (potentially with the assistance 
of larger nations or regional and international agencies). 
Because some of these jurisdictions involve widespread 
archipelagos, planning for within-country border control, 
especially for those populated islands with no airports, is 
also desirable.
Further modeling studies that are speciﬁ  c to the char-
acteristics of island jurisdictions are also needed to better 
determine the probability that border control can succeed 
in the modern era. Nevertheless, now that inﬂ  uenza trans-
mission is better understood, modiﬁ  cations could be made 
to enhance traditional border control measures to minimize 
disruptions. For example, in the event of a future pandem-
ic, islands could potentially still trade by ship or plane if 
they did not allow crews to disembark and if they instituted 
effective infection control with ongoing surveillance of 
workers who handle cargo.
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